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Good Agreements Make Good Friends
2013
NatSciRep13
When starting a new collaborative endeavor, it pays to establish upfront how strongly your partner commits to the common goal and what compensation can be expected in case the col- laboration is violated. Diverse examples in biological and social contexts have demonstrated the pervasiveness of making prior agreements on posterior compensations, suggesting that this behavior could have been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze the evolutionary relevance of such a commitment strategy and relate it to the costly punishment strategy, where no prior agreements are made. We show that when the cost of arranging a commitment deal lies within certain limits, substantial levels of cooperation can be achieved. Moreover, these levels are higher than that achieved by simple costly punishment, especially when one insists on sharing the arrangement cost. Not only do we show that good agreements make good friends, agreements based on shared costs result in even better outcomes.
Journal
Han The Anh, Luís Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos, Tom Lenaerts
Nature Scientific Reports
Nature Publishing Group
http://www.nature.com/srep/index.html
3
269
DOI:10.1038/srep02695
-
2045-2322
-
http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/good_agreements.pdf
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Han The Anh and Luís Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts, Good Agreements Make Good Friends, Nature Scientific Reports, Vol. 3, No. 269, Pag. DOI:10.1038/srep02695, Nature Publishing Group, http://www.nature.com/srep/index.html, ISSN 2045-2322, (http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/good_agreements.pdf), 2013.
<b><a href="/people/members/view.php?code=cdc7090d1f84f56c0671baa36e87bd77" class="author">Han The Anh</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=6175f826202ff877fba2ad77784cb9cb" class="author">Luís Moniz Pereira</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=ecbe12c4c0d80a28bae741293af61956" class="author">Francisco C. Santos</a> and Tom Lenaerts</b>, <u>Good Agreements Make Good Friends</u>, Nature Scientific Reports, Vol. 3, No. 269, Pag. DOI:10.1038/srep02695, Nature Publishing Group, http://www.nature.com/srep/index.html, ISSN 2045-2322, (<a href="http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/good_agreements.pdf" target="_blank">url</a>), 2013.
@article {NatSciRep13, author = {Han The Anh and Lu\'{\i}s Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts}, title = {Good Agreements Make Good Friends}, journal = {Nature Scientific Reports}, publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, address = {http://www.nature.com/srep/index.html}, volume = {3}, number = {269}, pages = {DOI:10.1038/srep02695}, issn = {2045-2322}, url = {http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/good_agreements.pdf}, abstract = {When starting a new collaborative endeavor, it pays to establish upfront how strongly your partner commits to the common goal and what compensation can be expected in case the col- laboration is violated. Diverse examples in biological and social contexts have demonstrated the pervasiveness of making prior agreements on posterior compensations, suggesting that this behavior could have been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze the evolutionary relevance of such a commitment strategy and relate it to the costly punishment strategy, where no prior agreements are made. We show that when the cost of arranging a commitment deal lies within certain limits, substantial levels of cooperation can be achieved. Moreover, these levels are higher than that achieved by simple costly punishment, especially when one insists on sharing the arrangement cost. Not only do we show that good agreements make good friends, agreements based on shared costs result in even better outcomes.}, keywords = {Commitments, Punishment, Evolutionary Game Theory}, year = {2013}, }
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