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Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas
March 2015
synintreccom
Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced, and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition.
Journal
Han The Anh, Francisco C. Santos, Tom Lenaerts, Luís Moniz Pereira
Scientific Reports
Nature Publishing Group
-
5
9312
DOI:10.1038/srep09312
-
2045-2322
http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/synergy_intention+commitment.pdf
http://www.nature.com/srep/2015/150320/srep09312/full/srep09312.html
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Han The Anh and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts and Luís Moniz Pereira, Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas, Scientific Reports, Vol. 5, No. 9312, Pag. DOI:10.1038/srep09312, Nature Publishing Group, ISSN 2045-2322, <i>http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/synergy_intention+commitment.pdf</i>, (http://www.nature.com/srep/2015/150320/srep09312/full/srep09312.html), March 2015.
<b><a href="/people/members/view.php?code=cdc7090d1f84f56c0671baa36e87bd77" class="author">Han The Anh</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=ecbe12c4c0d80a28bae741293af61956" class="author">Francisco C. Santos</a>, Tom Lenaerts and <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=6175f826202ff877fba2ad77784cb9cb" class="author">Luís Moniz Pereira</a></b>, <u>Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas</u>, Scientific Reports, Vol. 5, No. 9312, Pag. DOI:10.1038/srep09312, Nature Publishing Group, ISSN 2045-2322, <i>http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/synergy_intention+commitment.pdf</i>, (<a href="http://www.nature.com/srep/2015/150320/srep09312/full/srep09312.html" target="_blank">url</a>), March 2015.
@article {synintreccom, author = {Han The Anh and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts and Lu\'{\i}s Moniz Pereira}, title = {Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas}, journal = {Scientific Reports}, publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, volume = {5}, number = {9312}, pages = {DOI:10.1038/srep09312}, issn = {2045-2322}, note = {http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/synergy_intention+commitment.pdf}, url = {http://www.nature.com/srep/2015/150320/srep09312/full/srep09312.html}, abstract = {Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced, and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition.}, keywords = {Behavioural methods, Evolutionary theory, Social evolution, Biological physics}, month = {March}, year = {2015}, }
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