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Why Is It So Hard to Say Sorry? Evolution of Apology with Commitments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
August 2013
HPSL-IJCAI13
When making a mistake, individuals can apologize to secure further cooperation, even if the apology is costly. Similarly, individuals arrange commitments to guarantee that an action such as a co- operative one is in the others’ best interest, and thus will be carried out to avoid eventual penalties for commitment failure. Hence, both apology and commitment should go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here we provide a computational model showing that apologizing acts are rare in non-committed interactions, especially whenever cooperation is very costly, and that arranging prior commitments can considerably increase the frequency of such behavior. In addition, we show that in both cases, with or without commitments, apology works only if it is sincere, i.e. costly enough. Furthermore, we show that this strategy of apology supported by commitments outperforms the famous existent strategies of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In proceedings
Han The Anh, Luís Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos, Tom Lenaerts
Francesca Rossi
Proceedings of IJCAI 2013
IJCAI
AAAI Press
2275 East Bayshore Road, Suite 160, Palo Alto CA 94303 USA
1
177-183
978-1-57735-633-2
-
-
http://ijcai.org/papers13/Papers/IJCAI13-036.pdf
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Han The Anh and Luís Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts, Why Is It So Hard to Say Sorry? Evolution of Apology with Commitments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in: Francesca Rossi (eds), Proceedings of IJCAI 2013, IJCAI, AAAI Press, 2275 East Bayshore Road, Suite 160, Palo Alto CA 94303 USA, Vol. 1, ISBN 978-1-57735-633-2, Pag. 177-183, (http://ijcai.org/papers13/Papers/IJCAI13-036.pdf), August 2013.
<a href="/people/members/view.php?code=cdc7090d1f84f56c0671baa36e87bd77" class="author">Han The Anh</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=6175f826202ff877fba2ad77784cb9cb" class="author">Luís Moniz Pereira</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=ecbe12c4c0d80a28bae741293af61956" class="author">Francisco C. Santos</a> and Tom Lenaerts, <b>Why Is It So Hard to Say Sorry? Evolution of Apology with Commitments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma</b>, in: Francesca Rossi (eds), <u>Proceedings of IJCAI 2013</u>, IJCAI, AAAI Press, 2275 East Bayshore Road, Suite 160, Palo Alto CA 94303 USA, Vol. 1, ISBN 978-1-57735-633-2, Pag. 177-183, (<a href="http://ijcai.org/papers13/Papers/IJCAI13-036.pdf" target="_blank">url</a>), August 2013.
@inproceedings {HPSL-IJCAI13, author = {Han The Anh and Lu\'{\i}s Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos and Tom Lenaerts}, editor = {Francesca Rossi}, title = {Why Is It So Hard to Say Sorry? Evolution of Apology with Commitments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma}, booktitle = {Proceedings of IJCAI 2013}, series = {IJCAI}, publisher = {AAAI Press}, address = {2275 East Bayshore Road, Suite 160, Palo Alto CA 94303 USA}, volume = {1}, pages = {177-183}, isbn = {978-1-57735-633-2}, url = {http://ijcai.org/papers13/Papers/IJCAI13-036.pdf}, abstract = {When making a mistake, individuals can apologize to secure further cooperation, even if the apology is costly. Similarly, individuals arrange commitments to guarantee that an action such as a co- operative one is in the others’ best interest, and thus will be carried out to avoid eventual penalties for commitment failure. Hence, both apology and commitment should go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here we provide a computational model showing that apologizing acts are rare in non-committed interactions, especially whenever cooperation is very costly, and that arranging prior commitments can considerably increase the frequency of such behavior. In addition, we show that in both cases, with or without commitments, apology works only if it is sincere, i.e. costly enough. Furthermore, we show that this strategy of apology supported by commitments outperforms the famous existent strategies of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.}, keywords = {apology, commitment, evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma}, month = {August}, year = {2013}, }
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