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The Emergence of Commitments and Cooperation
June 2012
EmComCoop-aamas12
Agents make commitments towards others to influence them. Most commitments depend on an incentive, to ensure that the action is in the agent’s interest and be carried out to avoid penalties. The capacity for using commitment strategies effectively is so important that natural selection may have shaped specialized capacities to make it possible. Evolutionary explanations for commitment, particularly its role in the evolution of cooperation, have been discussed in several fields, like Psychology and Philosophy. Using evolutionary game theory tools, we provide a new model showing that individuals tend to engage in commitments, leading to the emergence of cooperation even without repeated interactions. The model is tuned by two key parameters: the punishment cost of failing commitment, imposed on either side, and the cost of managing the deal. Analytical results and computer simulations show that cooperation can emerge if the punishment cost is large compared to the management cost.
In proceedings
Han The Anh, Luís Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos
V. Conitzer, et al.
Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012)
AAMAS
ACM
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http://dl.acm.org/event.cfm?id=RE146
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-
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forthcoming 2012
http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/aamas2012.pdf
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Han The Anh and Luís Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos, The Emergence of Commitments and Cooperation, in: V. Conitzer and et al. (eds), Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), AAMAS, ACM, Vol. http://dl.acm.org/event.cfm?id=RE146, (http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/aamas2012.pdf), forthcoming 2012, June 2012.
<a href="/people/members/view.php?code=cdc7090d1f84f56c0671baa36e87bd77" class="author">Han The Anh</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=6175f826202ff877fba2ad77784cb9cb" class="author">Luís Moniz Pereira</a> and <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=ecbe12c4c0d80a28bae741293af61956" class="author">Francisco C. Santos</a>, <b>The Emergence of Commitments and Cooperation</b>, in: V. Conitzer and et al. (eds), <u>Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012)</u>, AAMAS, <a href="http://www.acm.org/pubs/" title="Link to external entity..." target="_blank" class="publisher">ACM</a>, Vol. http://dl.acm.org/event.cfm?id=RE146, (<a href="http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/aamas2012.pdf" target="_blank">url</a>), <i>forthcoming 2012</i>, June 2012.
@inproceedings {EmComCoop-aamas12, author = {Han The Anh and Lu\'{\i}s Moniz Pereira and Francisco C. Santos}, editor = {V. Conitzer and et al.}, title = {The Emergence of Commitments and Cooperation}, booktitle = {Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012)}, series = {AAMAS}, publisher = {ACM}, volume = {http://dl.acm.org/event.cfm?id=RE146}, note = {forthcoming 2012}, url = {http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/aamas2012.pdf}, abstract = {Agents make commitments towards others to influence them. Most commitments depend on an incentive, to ensure that the action is in the agent’s interest and be carried out to avoid penalties. The capacity for using commitment strategies effectively is so important that natural selection may have shaped specialized capacities to make it possible. Evolutionary explanations for commitment, particularly its role in the evolution of cooperation, have been discussed in several fields, like Psychology and Philosophy. Using evolutionary game theory tools, we provide a new model showing that individuals tend to engage in commitments, leading to the emergence of cooperation even without repeated interactions. The model is tuned by two key parameters: the punishment cost of failing commitment, imposed on either side, and the cost of managing the deal. Analytical results and computer simulations show that cooperation can emerge if the punishment cost is large compared to the management cost.}, keywords = {Evolution of Commitment, Evolution of Cooperation, Evo- lutionary Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma}, month = {June}, year = {2012}, }
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