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Avoiding or Restricting Defectors in Public Goods Games?
February 2015
avorestrdefpgg
When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of Public Goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.
Journal
Han The Anh, Luís Moniz Pereira, Tom Lenaerts
Journal of the Royal Society Interface
The Royal Society Publishing
6-9 Carlton House Terrace LONDON SW1Y 5AG
12
103
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2
-
1742-5662
http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/commitment_PGG.pdf
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1203
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Han The Anh and Luís Moniz Pereira and Tom Lenaerts, Avoiding or Restricting Defectors in Public Goods Games?, Journal of the Royal Society Interface, Vol. 12, No. 103, Pag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2, The Royal Society Publishing, 6-9 Carlton House Terrace LONDON SW1Y 5AG, ISSN 1742-5662, <i>http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/commitment_PGG.pdf</i>, (http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1203), February 2015.
<b><a href="/people/members/view.php?code=cdc7090d1f84f56c0671baa36e87bd77" class="author">Han The Anh</a>, <a href="/people/members/view.php?code=6175f826202ff877fba2ad77784cb9cb" class="author">Luís Moniz Pereira</a> and Tom Lenaerts</b>, <u>Avoiding or Restricting Defectors in Public Goods Games?</u>, Journal of the Royal Society Interface, Vol. 12, No. 103, Pag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2, The Royal Society Publishing, 6-9 Carlton House Terrace LONDON SW1Y 5AG, ISSN 1742-5662, <i>http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/commitment_PGG.pdf</i>, (<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1203" target="_blank">url</a>), February 2015.
@article {avorestrdefpgg, author = {Han The Anh and Lu\'{\i}s Moniz Pereira and Tom Lenaerts}, title = {Avoiding or Restricting Defectors in Public Goods Games?}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Society Interface}, publisher = {The Royal Society Publishing}, address = {6-9 Carlton House Terrace LONDON SW1Y 5AG}, volume = {12}, number = {103}, pages = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2}, issn = {1742-5662}, note = {http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/publications/online-papers/commitment_PGG.pdf}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1203}, abstract = {When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of Public Goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.}, keywords = {evolutionary games, cooperation, commitment, public goods}, month = {February}, year = {2015}, }
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