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Focused Correlation and Confirmation
March 2009
Wheeler:2009a
This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation. This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's "truth-conduciveness" problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted.
Journal
Gregory Wheeler
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Oxford University Press
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60
1
79-100
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Gregory Wheeler, Focused Correlation and Confirmation, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 60, No. 1, Pag. 79-100, Oxford University Press, March 2009.
<b><a href="/people/members/view.php?code=768e30c2109e32d4ad41104cf0167777" class="author">Gregory Wheeler</a></b>, <u>Focused Correlation and Confirmation</u>, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 60, No. 1, Pag. 79-100, Oxford University Press, March 2009.
@article {Wheeler:2009a, author = {Gregory Wheeler}, title = {Focused Correlation and Confirmation}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, volume = {60}, number = {1}, pages = {79-100}, abstract = {This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation. This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's "truth-conduciveness" problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted.}, month = {March}, year = {2009}, }
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